gremlin
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from GitHub issues and pull requests, which is then used to construct prompts for sub-agents, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: GitHub issue content and PR diffs are fetched in
SKILL.mdusing theghCLI tool. - Boundary markers: The prompts for the sub-agents (Inspector General, Chaos Gremlin, and Standards Auditor) include untrusted work products without explicit sanitization or clear delimiters to prevent the model from following instructions embedded within the reviewed content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to modify the state of GitHub issues and post PR reviews using
gh issue editandgh pr review. - Sanitization: No formal sanitization of external text is performed before it is passed to the sub-agents, although 'Iron Law 01' requires stripping rationales before the final synthesis step.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses external inputs (issue numbers and idea slugs) directly in shell commands, which could lead to command injection if the inputs are not strictly validated.
- In SKILL.md, the
{issue-number}provided as an argument is passed directly togh issue view,gh issue edit, andgh issue commentcommands. - While the
{idea-slug}is explicitly sanitized (lowercase, spaces to hyphens, special characters removed), the{issue-number}lacks a similar validation step to ensure it is purely numeric before execution.
Audit Metadata