candidate-sourcing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external sources such as GitHub profiles, ArXiv papers, and web search results to generate email outreach and populate trackers.\n
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
web_search_live,person_search, andweb_enrich_livetool calls described inSKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions within the ingested candidate data (e.g., in bios or headlines) before interpolation into emails.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent utilizes capabilities including script execution via the
executetool and email draft creation viagmail_create_draft.\n - Sanitization: While the CSV logging uses
csv.DictWriter, the email body generation lacks specific sanitization to prevent the agent from reacting to malicious instructions hidden in the candidate's technical output or profile metadata.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic code generation to interact with APIs and manage local files.\n - Evidence:
SKILL.mdprovides multiple JavaScript templates for the agent to generate and run via theexecutetool to perform complex database queries and enrichment.\n - Evidence: Phase 5 in
SKILL.mdgenerates a Python script to handle CSV logging for the outreach tracker.
Audit Metadata