browser-control
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of system commands including
osascript,curl,node, andpython3to automate browser actions and manage a local background proxy server. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile implements an update mechanism that executesnpx update-kit, which downloads and runs code from the npm registry at runtime without fixed version pinning. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes a dedicated module (
modules/console-network.md) to inject JavaScript into the browser for intercepting console logs and network requests (XHR/Fetch). This can be used to capture sensitive data such as session cookies, authorization tokens, and personal information. Additionally, the CDP proxy provides asetFilesAPI that can programmatically upload local files to web forms, creating a path for local data exposure. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: As a tool designed to read and interact with arbitrary web pages, the skill is highly exposed to indirect prompt injection. Malicious websites could contain hidden instructions intended to manipulate the agent's behavior or exfiltrate data from authenticated sessions.
- Ingestion points: Web pages processed via
WebFetch,Jina,curl, and CDP-based extraction (modules/dom-extraction.md). - Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt templates or scripts.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution (
osascript,node,python3), network access viacurl, and file system writes for screenshots. - Sanitization: Relies on instructional guidelines for the agent to avoid untrusted JavaScript, rather than programmatic enforcement.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
r.jina.aifor content conversion and references theomni-search-skillrepository on GitHub for enhanced search features.
Audit Metadata