databricks-ml-training
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The custom pyfunc model template in
references/custom-pyfunc.mdutilizes thepicklemodule to load preprocessor and booster artifacts during model initialization. If a model is registered with malicious artifacts, this results in arbitrary code execution during inference. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the 'Models from Code' pattern via
python_model='model.py', which dynamically loads and executes Python classes from locally defined scripts in the serving environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: GenAI agent reference architectures in
references/genai-agents.mdand streaming feature definitions inreferences/feature-views.mdestablish ingestion points for untrusted data from Kafka event streams and Unity Catalog function outputs. These inputs are processed by LLM-based agents without explicit boundary markers or sanitization, making them vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks. - Ingestion points:
ResponsesAgentRequestinputs and Kafka message payloads (value.*fields) processed by the agent graph. - Boundary markers: The provided LangGraph templates lack explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in external data.
- Capability inventory: The agent context includes permissions for executing Unity Catalog functions, querying Vector Search indexes, and calling Foundation Model API endpoints.
- Sanitization: The reference implementations do not demonstrate payload validation or escaping of external content prior to agent processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Databricks CLI to perform file operations and job submissions, which involves local subprocess execution to interact with the Databricks workspace.
Audit Metadata