databricks-ml-training

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The custom pyfunc model template in references/custom-pyfunc.md utilizes the pickle module to load preprocessor and booster artifacts during model initialization. If a model is registered with malicious artifacts, this results in arbitrary code execution during inference.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the 'Models from Code' pattern via python_model='model.py', which dynamically loads and executes Python classes from locally defined scripts in the serving environment.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: GenAI agent reference architectures in references/genai-agents.md and streaming feature definitions in references/feature-views.md establish ingestion points for untrusted data from Kafka event streams and Unity Catalog function outputs. These inputs are processed by LLM-based agents without explicit boundary markers or sanitization, making them vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: ResponsesAgentRequest inputs and Kafka message payloads (value.* fields) processed by the agent graph.
  • Boundary markers: The provided LangGraph templates lack explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in external data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent context includes permissions for executing Unity Catalog functions, querying Vector Search indexes, and calling Foundation Model API endpoints.
  • Sanitization: The reference implementations do not demonstrate payload validation or escaping of external content prior to agent processing.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Databricks CLI to perform file operations and job submissions, which involves local subprocess execution to interact with the Databricks workspace.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 25, 2026, 06:28 PM