skill-eval-builder
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
run-evals.pyand the subsequently generatedrun.pyutilizesubprocess.runwithshell=Trueto execute strings retrieved from thecases.mdconfiguration file. Specifically, thefired_whenandvalidatefields are executed as raw shell commands to check for side effects and output validity. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scaffold-evals.pyscript usesos.chmodto grant executable permissions (0o755) to the runner scripts it creates in the target directory. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill enables arbitrary command execution via data parsing. If the agent is influenced by a malicious target skill through indirect prompt injection, it could be coerced into writing harmful shell instructions into the
cases.mdfile, which are then executed when the user runs the evaluation script. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection because it reads and interprets the content of external skill directories (
SKILL.md, scripts, references) to guide its scaffolding process. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.md, references, and scripts of the target skill are read from the local file system (specified viatarget-skill-dir). - Boundary markers: None are present to distinguish between instructions for the builder and the content being analyzed.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands through the generated test runners and invoke the
claudeCLI. - Sanitization: There is no validation or escaping of the command strings extracted from Markdown files before they are passed to the shell.
Audit Metadata