ai-migration-operating-model
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Utility scripts located in the
assets/directory (capacity_probe.py,e2e_shard.py,impact.py,machine_lock.py) make extensive use of thesubprocessmodule to execute system tools and user-defined command templates. e2e_shard.pyexecutes setup and capture commands provided as shell templates.impact.pyexecutes adeps_cmdstring defined in a configuration file viasubprocess.run(..., shell=True).- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
impact.pyscript is vulnerable to a form of local command injection. It identifies "suites" by parsing filenames in the project's golden scenario directory and then interpolates these names into the{suite}placeholder within the shell-executeddeps_cmdwithout usingshlex.quote()or similar sanitization. - If an attacker provides a project containing a file named like
suite;malicious_command;__scenario.json, the malicious command would be executed when the impact tool is run. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of arbitrary shell commands through its sharding and impact analysis tools. While these are necessary for the primary function of the skill (migrating and testing code), they represent a dynamic execution surface that processes project-specific data (filenames and command templates).
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The self-discovery logic provided in
SKILL.mduses afindcommand that scans broad, potentially sensitive directories including~/.claude,~/.config, and~/.agentsto locate the skill's base directory. While the intent is functional (locating bundled assets), this involves unauthorized directory traversal across sensitive configuration folders.
Audit Metadata