skills/dicklesworthstone/agent_flywheel_clawdbot_skills_and_integrations/agent-mail/Gen Agent Trust Hub
agent-mail
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 4, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
fix_cc_mcpscript defined inreferences/FIX-MCP-CONFIG.mdaccesses the sensitive configuration file~/.claude.jsonto extract and reuseAuthorizationbearer tokens. It also searches for credentials in the~/mcp_agent_mail/.envfile. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's documentation (
references/INSTALL.md,references/FIX-MCP-CONFIG.md) promotes the high-risk practice of piping remote content from the vendor's GitHub repository directly into the shell usingcurl | bash. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
fix_cc_mcputility script executes code from an external, third-party package usingnpx -y @morphllm/morphmcpduring the configuration restoration process. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill initiates downloads of remote scripts and dependencies from
raw.githubusercontent.comand the NPM registry. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to generate a shell script (
~/.local/bin/fix_cc_mcp) at runtime by concatenating commands into a file and granting it execution permissions viachmod +x. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill installs a utility script into the user's local binary directory (
~/.local/bin/), which ensures the script remains available across different sessions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process messages from multiple agents, which introduces a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection. Evidence includes:
- Ingestion points: Tools like
fetch_inboxandsummarize_threadread message bodies (body_md) and thread histories provided by other agents. - Boundary markers: The system uses JSON frontmatter for message metadata but lacks explicit instruction-filtering delimiters for the message bodies themselves.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (
curl), write to the filesystem, and modify environment configurations. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or safety-filtering applied to the external message content before it is processed or summarized by the LLM.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata