slb
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 4, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation instructions recommend downloading a shell script from a remote repository and piping it directly to
bash. This allows for unverified code execution with user-level privileges.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is primarily a wrapper for executing arbitrary shell commands, which are classified into risk tiers. It exposes commands likeslb runandslb emergency-executeto the agent.\n- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill provides tools to modify agent-specific configuration files (e.g.,~/.claude/hooks.jsonand.cursorrules) to integrate with the tool's gating mechanism, effectively persisting its presence in the agent's workflow.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The system's 'two-person rule' relies on external input (reviews/approvals) that could be manipulated by an attacker who influences the agent's context or the review chain.\n - Ingestion points: Command strings passed to
slb runinSKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided documentation for command inputs.\n
- Capability inventory: Full shell command execution via the
slbtool documented inCOMMANDS.md.\n - Sanitization: Relies on risk patterns rather than strict sanitization of the command strings.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/slb/main/scripts/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata