skills/dicklesworthstone/agent_flywheel_clawdbot_skills_and_integrations/wezterm/Gen Agent Trust Hub
wezterm
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions include a one-liner that downloads a remote shell script from GitHub and pipes it directly into bash for execution.
- Evidence:
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/misc_coding_agent_tips_and_scripts/main/wezterm-mux-tune.sh | bashfound inSKILL.mdandreferences/PERFORMANCE-TUNING.md. - Risk: This execution pattern allows the remote source to execute arbitrary commands on the local system without verification or version pinning.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill directs the user to perform actions that weaken system security and require root access.
- Evidence:
sudo sysctl -w kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=0(SKILL.md). Disablingptrace_scoperemoves a key security layer that prevents processes from attaching to and inspecting other running processes. - Software Installation: Instructs the use of
sudo apt-get installto install software likereptyrandwezterm(references/PERSISTENT-SESSIONS.md). - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill provides configuration for maintaining persistent access and background processes across user sessions.
- Evidence: Creation of a systemd user service (
wezterm-mux-server.service) and the use ofsudo loginctl enable-linger $USERto ensure the user's processes continue running after logout (references/PERSISTENT-SESSIONS.md). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads external resources and configures third-party package repositories.
- Evidence: Fetches a GPG key from
https://apt.fury.io/wez/gpg.keyto configure an external APT repository for WezTerm (references/PERSISTENT-SESSIONS.md). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
wezterm clito programmatically interact with the terminal environment, including injecting text into active panes. - Evidence: Extensive documentation of
wezterm cli send-text,wezterm cli spawn, andwezterm cli split-paneused to control session behavior (references/COMMANDS.md). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to manage environments where multiple AI agents produce high-volume output, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect injection.
- Ingestion points: Processes continuous output streams from multiple agents such as Claude Code and Codex (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: There are no specified delimiters or boundary markers to isolate agent output from the management context.
- Capability inventory: The skill has full terminal control capabilities, including the ability to split panes and inject text/commands via CLI.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of ingested agent output is implemented.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/misc_coding_agent_tips_and_scripts/main/wezterm-mux-tune.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata