cm
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 4, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
AGENTS.mdfile contains explicit behavioral overrides, such as 'RULE 0 - THE FUNDAMENTAL OVERRIDE PREROGATIVE,' which instructs agents to disregard other rules if commanded. This pattern is designed to force agent compliance and bypass established constraints.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an 'Autonomous Curation Engine' (ACE) that processes raw session logs to extract rules. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8) where malicious instructions embedded in session data could be 'learned' by the agent as permanent playbook rules.
- Ingestion points: Session logs are ingested via
src/diary.tsandsrc/reflect.tsusing thecasssearch engine. - Boundary markers: Absent; trajectories are processed as raw content for insight extraction.
- Capability inventory: System command execution (
execSync,spawn), network access for LLM APIs, and optional remote machine access viassh(found insrc/cass.ts). - Sanitization: Present;
src/sanitize.tsredacts API keys and common secrets before data is passed to the LLM. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
README.mdand installation guides promote the use of remote shell scripts piped to bash (curl | bash) for installing the tool and its runtime (Bun). While these originate from trusted or vendor-owned sources, they represent a remote code execution vector common in developer tools. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The core functionality relies on executing system commands through
child_processmodules to interact with thecasssearch binary and manage local file locking.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://bun.sh/install, https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/cass_memory_system/main/install.sh, https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${OWNER}/${REPO}/main/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata