slb

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 28, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The AGENTS.md file contains explicit behavioral overrides, such as 'Rule 0', which demands absolute obedience to author instructions over following guidelines. A specific note for Codex/GPT-5.2 also instructs the agent to 'fool itself' into thinking it made changes it didn't actually perform, effectively suppressing native agent warnings about external or concurrent file modifications.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The README.md and SKILL.md files promote an installation method using curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/slb/main/scripts/install.sh | bash. This pattern involves piping a remote script directly to a shell, which allows for remote code execution.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The core utility of the skill is to authorize and execute shell commands. Files such as internal/core/command.go and internal/core/execute.go utilize os/exec to run arbitrary commands in the user's shell environment, inheriting all current environment variables and credentials.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The installation script and command classification engine include the use of sudo, providing a path for executing commands with elevated privileges during setup or operation.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/slb/main/scripts/install.sh?$(date, https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/slb/main/scripts/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Apr 28, 2026, 08:12 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — slb