propagate-design-change
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from project documentation files which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during the impact analysis phase.
- Ingestion points: Reads content from
design/gdd/,docs/architecture/, anddesign/registry/entities.yaml(SKILL.md, Phase 2, 4, 5). - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the analyzed documents.
- Capability inventory: The agent has
WriteandEditpermissions, and can executeBashscripts to replace file sections (Phase 7) or create new report files (Phase 9). - Sanitization: Absent; the content extracted from external documents is processed and quoted directly without validation or filtering.
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes the
!commandsyntax to executeyaml-helper.shat load time. This is used for environment configuration and resolving project-specific settings. While this occurs automatically upon skill activation, the command is hardcoded to a local hook script and does not incorporate unvalidated user arguments. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on several local bash scripts (
adr-status.sh,md-section.sh,yaml-helper.sh) and standardgitcommands (git diff,git log) to perform its functions. These operations are essential for tracking document changes and managing the architecture traceability matrix within the repository.
Audit Metadata