propagate-design-change

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from project documentation files which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during the impact analysis phase.
  • Ingestion points: Reads content from design/gdd/, docs/architecture/, and design/registry/entities.yaml (SKILL.md, Phase 2, 4, 5).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the analyzed documents.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has Write and Edit permissions, and can execute Bash scripts to replace file sections (Phase 7) or create new report files (Phase 9).
  • Sanitization: Absent; the content extracted from external documents is processed and quoted directly without validation or filtering.
  • [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes the !command syntax to execute yaml-helper.sh at load time. This is used for environment configuration and resolving project-specific settings. While this occurs automatically upon skill activation, the command is hardcoded to a local hook script and does not incorporate unvalidated user arguments.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on several local bash scripts (adr-status.sh, md-section.sh, yaml-helper.sh) and standard git commands (git diff, git log) to perform its functions. These operations are essential for tracking document changes and managing the architecture traceability matrix within the repository.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 22, 2026, 01:12 PM