vertical-slice
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill reads and processes content from multiple external project files, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions in design documents could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
CLAUDE.md,design/gdd/game-concept.md,design/gdd/systems-index.md,docs/architecture/architecture.md, anddocs/architecture/control-manifest.mdin Phase 1 to define its scope and technical constraints. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or explicit instructions provided to the agent to treat the ingested project content as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-writing capabilities (
Write,Edit) to specific project directories, shell execution (Bash) restricted to a project-local helper script, and the ability to spawn sub-agents (Agent) for creative reviews. - Sanitization: Absent. No sanitization, escaping, or validation is performed on the content of the ingested markdown files before they are interpreted.
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes dynamic context injection to resolve configuration values at the moment the skill is loaded.
- Evidence: The skill starts with
!bash "${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/../../hooks/yaml-helper.sh" resolve_config --keys review_mode,automation,workflow, which executes a shell command silently when the file is opened. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of a local shell script residing outside of the skill's specific directory.
- Evidence: The skill is configured to allow and invoke
bash "*/.claude/skills/vertical-slice/../../hooks/yaml-helper.sh" resolve_config *. - Note: This script appears to be a project-level utility, but its execution means the skill is dependent on external executable code whose content is not provided within the skill itself.
Audit Metadata