skills/dy9759/agentlink0401/agentmesh/Gen Agent Trust Hub

agentmesh

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of untrusted data from an external messaging network which can influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from the AgentMesh network via tools like agentmesh_check_messages, agentmesh_owner_inbox, and agentmesh_owner_conversations as seen in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit markers or instructions provided to the agent to distinguish between user intent and instructions contained within the fetched messages.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has high-privilege tool access including Bash, Write, Edit, and Read permissions.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or safety filtering of the message content is implemented.
  • Evidence: The 'Autonomous Mode' guide in Step 2.5 explicitly directs the agent to 'Automatically process messages as instructions' (收到消息后自动当作指令处理), which allows for indirect prompt injection where a remote user could send commands to the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill modifies the environment to execute code locally.
  • Evidence: Step 1.2 writes an entry to .mcp.json that executes a script using npx tsx <absolute-project-path>/packages/mcp-server/src/server.ts.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The MCP server configuration utilizes npx, which downloads packages from the npm registry at runtime if they are not already installed locally.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The setup process prompts the user for an AGENTMESH_API_KEY and persists it in plain text within the local .mcp.json configuration file.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 17, 2026, 06:35 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — agentmesh