skills/dyrits/skills/memorize/Gen Agent Trust Hub

memorize

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPERSISTENCEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The skill instructs agents to save 'lessons' and 'scripts' in the user's home directory (~/.agents/scripts/, ~/.agents/memory/). These files are intended to be read and acted upon by future agent sessions, creating a persistence mechanism that functions across different projects and environments.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The references/scripts.md file defines a workflow where agents write executable scripts to disk and subsequently execute them with arguments. This pattern of autonomous code generation and execution represents a significant security risk as it bypasses static instruction boundaries.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's architecture is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because agents are instructed to 'recall' and follow instructions found in AGENTS.md and other project files. 1. Ingestion points: AGENTS.md, .agents/scripts/INDEX.md, ~/.agents/scripts/INDEX.md, and various project documents (glossary.md, conventions.md). 2. Boundary markers: Absent; there is no isolation between untrusted 'memorized' data and the agent's core system instructions. 3. Capability inventory: The skill facilitates file writing, shell command execution (running generated scripts), and network operations (opening URLs in browser via wizards). 4. Sanitization: Absent; there is no evidence of validation or sanitization for the content being 'memorized' or 'recalled.'
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The 'Wizard' functionality (references/wizard.md and assets/template.sh) encourages the creation of scripts that perform sensitive operations, such as modifying .env files and using the GitHub CLI (gh secret set) to manage repository secrets.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 23, 2026, 09:27 AM