pixel-art
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
render.mjsscript utilizes thenode:child_processmodule to spawnffmpegandgoogle-chrome(via Puppeteer) for video encoding and frame rendering tasks. Thenew_project.shscript also executes shell commands likersync,cp,sed, andnpmto scaffold projects. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
template/src/kit.jsfile contains a call to(0, eval)(v)within thewindow.renderSheetfunction. This is designed to evaluate string expressions for crop coordinates and world points, allowing for dynamic positioning during the rendering of contact sheets. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to fetch external resources. The
new_project.shscript runsnpm install, downloading packages from the NPM registry. Thestudio.htmlfile loads font families fromfonts.googleapis.com. These are well-known and established services. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to generate animation code based on user-supplied briefs or reference descriptions. This creates an attack surface where a malicious brief could influence the agent to generate code that performs unintended actions when executed in the local rendering environment.
- Ingestion points: User-provided animation briefs and reference video descriptions defined in the
SKILL.mdworkflow. - Boundary markers: None present; the skill does not define delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions in the generated scripts.
- Capability inventory: The environment supports file system access, network downloads, dynamic JavaScript evaluation (
eval), and subprocess spawning (ffmpeg,chrome). - Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit sanitization or validation logic for the code expressions passed to the rendering engine.
Audit Metadata