blaw-edgar-search
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/resolve_exhibits.pyutilizessubprocess.runto execute multiple shell commands, includingrclone,ssh,scp, andtar. Thesshcommand specifically uses string formatting to construct a command string executed on the remote host, which includes parameters like--wrds-scratchthat could be influenced by input. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill employs JavaScript injection (
01-install-hook.jsand02-run-pager.js) within the browser environment. These scripts monkey-patchXMLHttpRequestto intercept network data and automate user actions like paging through results. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The workflow processes search results from Bloomberg Law and raw filing text from SEC EDGAR, creating an attack surface for instructions embedded in external documents.
- Ingestion points: Network responses captured from the Bloomberg Law search API and document text downloaded from the SEC archives via WRDS.
- Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt templates or processing scripts.
- Capability inventory: Execution of shell commands (rclone, ssh, scp, tar) in
resolve_exhibits.py, database queries viapsycopg, and local file system write operations. - Sanitization: Uses
BeautifulSoupfor HTML parsing and regex for phrase verification in the extracted text. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The database connection string in
scripts/resolve_exhibits.pycontains a hardcoded username for the WRDS PostgreSQL service, which appears to be a vendor-specific resource associated with the skill author.
Audit Metadata