crsp-v2
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains a dynamic command execution block used during skill initialization to generate a directory listing. - Evidence:
!d=${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}; command -v skill-toc >/dev/null 2>&1 && exec skill-toc "$d"; s=$HOME/.claude/skills/plugin-utils/bin/skill-toc; [ -x "$s" ] && exec "$s" "$d"; echo "(skill-toc unavailable...)"`` - This command is a benign utility intended to help the agent navigate the skill's reference files by executing a Table of Contents generator if the
plugin-utilspackage is installed. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a Python script
examples/ciz_panel.pythat executes SQL commands on the remote WRDS (Wharton Research Data Services) database server. - The script utilizes the
psycopg2library to establish connections towrds-pgdata.wharton.upenn.edu. - Security best practices are followed, including the use of parameterized queries (
%(start)s,%(end)s) to prevent SQL injection and reliance on local configuration files (~/.pgpass) rather than hardcoded credentials. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect injection as it ingests user-supplied parameters to build database queries.
- Ingestion points: Command-line arguments for start dates, end dates, and usernames in
examples/ciz_panel.py. - Boundary markers: The code uses standard SQL parameterization provided by the database driver to separate user data from the query logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill performs network database operations and optional local file writing (Parquet format).
- Sanitization: Input is processed through
argparseand passed to a mature database driver, mitigating the risk of injection during processing.
Audit Metadata