de-ai-revise
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The SKILL.md file uses the dynamic context syntax (!
command) to execute shell scripts whenever the skill is loaded by the agent. The embedded script attempts to execute a table-of-contents utility from the environment or a hardcoded path within the user's home directory (~/.claude/skills/plugin-utils/bin/skill-toc). - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/de_ai_audit.py utilizes importlib.util to dynamically load and execute prose-audit.py from a relative path (../../../scripts/prose-audit.py) outside of the skill's own directory. This allows the skill to execute arbitrary code located in the broader plugin structure.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses the uv package manager to install lxml and pyyaml at runtime via the shebang in scripts/de_ai_audit.py and instructions in SKILL.md. These dependencies are not pinned to specific versions, posing a potential supply chain risk if public registries are compromised.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and rewrite user-supplied prose drafts. Malicious instructions hidden within the input text could potentially influence the agent's behavior during the revision process.
- Ingestion points: Target text files are read and passed to the audit script and the LLM for editing.
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat the input text as untrusted data or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to Read, Edit, Write, Bash, Grep, and Glob tools, which could be abused if an injection is successful.
- Sanitization: The skill does not perform any sanitization or escaping of the input text before processing.
Audit Metadata