skills/edwinhu/workflows/docx-typst/Gen Agent Trust Hub

docx-typst

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently invokes system utilities to perform document conversions and repository management.
  • The following scripts use subprocess.run to call external tools: bib_to_entries.py (pandoc, typst), build.py (pandoc), canonicalize.py (pandoc), comments.py (gws), expand_citations.py (typst), make_redline.py (pandoc, pkill, soffice), provenance.py (git), and reconcile.py (git, pandoc).
  • These tools are standard for the skill's primary purpose of document translation and reconciliation.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external, potentially untrusted documents which introduces an indirect injection attack surface.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the system through external Word documents (.docx), BibTeX files (.bib), and Google Drive comments.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit delimiters or warnings to the AI agent to ignore instructions embedded within the converted text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files and execute a variety of system commands including document compilers and version control tools.
  • Sanitization: While the scripts perform significant regex-based normalization for formatting and structural correctness, they do not specifically filter for malicious natural language instructions meant to influence an AI's behavior.
  • Risk: An attacker could embed instructions in a Word document's text or comments that, when converted to Typst and read by an AI agent, could attempt to override the agent's behavior.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 7, 2026, 05:55 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — docx-typst