docx-typst
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently invokes system utilities to perform document conversions and repository management.
- The following scripts use
subprocess.runto call external tools:bib_to_entries.py(pandoc, typst),build.py(pandoc),canonicalize.py(pandoc),comments.py(gws),expand_citations.py(typst),make_redline.py(pandoc, pkill, soffice),provenance.py(git), andreconcile.py(git, pandoc). - These tools are standard for the skill's primary purpose of document translation and reconciliation.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external, potentially untrusted documents which introduces an indirect injection attack surface.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the system through external Word documents (
.docx), BibTeX files (.bib), and Google Drive comments. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit delimiters or warnings to the AI agent to ignore instructions embedded within the converted text.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files and execute a variety of system commands including document compilers and version control tools.
- Sanitization: While the scripts perform significant regex-based normalization for formatting and structural correctness, they do not specifically filter for malicious natural language instructions meant to influence an AI's behavior.
- Risk: An attacker could embed instructions in a Word document's text or comments that, when converted to Typst and read by an AI agent, could attempt to override the agent's behavior.
Audit Metadata