ds-validate
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill configures several automated hooks (
PreToolUse,PostToolUse) that execute Python scripts usinguv run python3for nearly every agent action. These include scripts likeds-post-subagent-guard.pyandds-no-main-chat-code-guard.pylocated in the plugin root. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a bash script
check-all-ds.shlocated at a relative path fromCLAUDE_SKILL_DIR, passing the current working directory as a parameter. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a shell command to dynamically discover the latest version of a JavaScript workflow file (
ds-validate-coverage.js) within the~/.claude/plugins/cache/edwinhu-plugins/directory. It then executes this script using theWorkflowtool. Loading and executing code from paths computed at runtime is a significant security risk. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external and potentially untrusted files including
SPEC.md,PLAN.md, andLEARNINGS.md. This data is used to drive the validation logic and populate the finalVALIDATION.mdreport. This represents an indirect prompt injection surface as malicious instructions in these files could influence agent behavior during the validation process. - Ingestion points:
.planning/SPEC.md,.planning/PLAN.md,.planning/LEARNINGS.md(read during Steps 1-3). - Boundary markers: None detected; content is extracted and processed directly.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (
bash,uv run), edit files, and run JavaScript workflows. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or escaping of the ingested content before it is used in the workflow logic.
Audit Metadata