skills/edwinhu/workflows/tuicr/Gen Agent Trust Hub

tuicr

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The SKILL.md file uses the ! syntax to execute a shell command at load time. This command attempts to locate and execute a skill-toc script from the local environment to build a table of contents.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts/launch-tuicr.sh script constructs and runs shell command strings through herdr or ghostty to facilitate TUI interaction. This pattern of wrapping terminal execution involves complex shell quoting and interpolation that represents a command execution risk.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts/resolve_session_test.py script utilizes subprocess.run to execute bash scripts during its contract tests, which can be risky if testing logic is exposed to untrusted inputs.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The scripts/resolve-session.sh script executes Python code dynamically using python3 -c to filter and process JSON session data.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to read user annotations from the tuicr session and 'address' them directly. This ingestion of external data without proper sanitization creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: Annotation content is read from tuicr review comments JSON output in Step 3 of the SKILL.md workflow.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack boundary markers or warnings to the agent to disregard instructions contained within the annotation text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including Bash, Write, and Edit, and it executes several shell scripts.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or safety filtering applied to the annotation content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 24, 2026, 05:59 PM