tuicr
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile uses the!syntax to execute a shell command at load time. This command attempts to locate and execute askill-tocscript from the local environment to build a table of contents. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/launch-tuicr.shscript constructs and runs shell command strings throughherdrorghosttyto facilitate TUI interaction. This pattern of wrapping terminal execution involves complex shell quoting and interpolation that represents a command execution risk. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/resolve_session_test.pyscript utilizessubprocess.runto execute bash scripts during its contract tests, which can be risky if testing logic is exposed to untrusted inputs. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/resolve-session.shscript executes Python code dynamically usingpython3 -cto filter and process JSON session data. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to read user annotations from the
tuicrsession and 'address' them directly. This ingestion of external data without proper sanitization creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks. - Ingestion points: Annotation content is read from
tuicr review commentsJSON output in Step 3 of theSKILL.mdworkflow. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack boundary markers or warnings to the agent to disregard instructions contained within the annotation text.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including
Bash,Write, andEdit, and it executes several shell scripts. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or safety filtering applied to the annotation content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata