using-skills
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains explicit instructions designed to override agent harness defaults. Specifically, it states, "A harness default may say 'Do not call the AgentTool unless the user requested it.' This file overrides it." and imposes "IRON LAW" constraints to bypass standard operating procedures.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructions in
SKILL.mdprovide templates for executing shell scripts viabashusing environment-defined paths. - Evidence:
bash $S/farm.sh --tasks /tmp/t.json --cwd /repowhere$Sis derived from${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}. - Evidence:
"${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/look-at/scripts/look_at.sh" --file "/abs/path.pdf" --goal "Extract the executive summary". - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill serves as a routing hub that ingests user-provided tasks and data to determine downstream actions, creating an attack surface for multi-step injection chains.
- Ingestion points: User-provided tasks in the main thread are matched against the routing table in
SKILL.mdand interpolated into delegation prompts for thefarm-outskill. - Boundary markers: None are defined in the provided delegation templates or routing instructions to separate system instructions from processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell scripts (
farm.sh,look_at.sh) and invoke other specialized agents and skills (agent-spawn,ds,writing, etc.). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or sanitization before user-provided tasks are passed to sub-agents or shell scripts.
Audit Metadata