workshop-revise
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several shell hooks and direct commands via
uv run python3to enforce constraints and perform checks. This includes a dynamic context injection pattern inSKILL.md(!uv run python3 ...) that executes at the moment the skill is loaded to populate the session with Typst constraints. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: In Step 4 (Verify), the skill dynamically locates and executes a widow detection script by searching the user's plugin cache directory (
~/.claude/plugins/cache/tinymist-plugin/...). This relies on a computed path for execution, which is a technique that could be abused if the cache contents are manipulated. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it reads and processes multiple project-specific files including
slides.typ,notes.typ,.planning/SOURCES.md, and.planning/HANDOFF.md. - Ingestion points: Multiple files are read into the agent's context, including presentation source code (
slides.typ,notes.typ) and planning metadata. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the processed Typst or Markdown files.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (
Bashtool in Step 4) and write/edit files on the local system. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content ingested from the presentation files before it is processed or used in decision-making.
Audit Metadata