docx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pycontains logic to compile a C source string (_SHIM_SOURCE) into a shared object file (lo_socket_shim.so) at runtime usinggcc. This code is then used for process injection. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
LD_PRELOADenvironment variable inscripts/office/soffice.pyto inject the dynamically compiled shared library into thesoffice(LibreOffice) process. This technique is used to intercept and redirect standard system calls related to socket communication. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple external command-line tools via subprocess calls, including
soffice(LibreOffice),pandoc,pdftoppm, andgcc. These tools are necessary for document conversion, text extraction, and the compilation of the functional shim. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill extracts text and structure from external
.docxfiles, which provides a surface for indirect prompt injection if the documents contain adversarial content. - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through
pandoctext extraction and XML file processing inscripts/office/unpack.py. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of clear delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands when the agent reads extracted text.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities including executing system commands, compiling and injecting code, and performing complex file system operations.
- Sanitization: The skill effectively mitigates XML External Entity (XXE) attacks by using the
defusedxmllibrary for all XML parsing operations.
Audit Metadata