internal-comms
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of data from untrusted external sources to generate reports and newsletters.
- Ingestion points: The files
examples/3p-updates.md,examples/company-newsletter.md, andexamples/faq-answers.mdinstruct the agent to gather context from Slack channels, email threads, Google Drive documents, and Calendar events. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings for the content being processed from external tools.
- Capability inventory: The skill leverages the agent's ability to read organizational communication and storage platforms.
- Sanitization: There are no instructions for sanitizing, validating, or filtering the content pulled from these external sources, creating a risk that malicious instructions embedded in a Slack message or email could be interpreted as instructions by the agent or propagated into the final communication.
Audit Metadata