internal-comms
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it retrieves and processes content from potentially untrusted external sources (Slack, Google Drive, Email, and Calendar) to generate its outputs.\n
- Ingestion points: Instructions in
examples/3p-updates.md,examples/company-newsletter.md, andexamples/faq-answers.mddirect the agent to gather context from Slack messages, Google Drive documents, emails, and calendar events.\n - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or explicit instructions to treat the fetched content purely as data, leaving the agent vulnerable to instructions embedded within those sources.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the agent's broad access to corporate communication and productivity tools to aggregate information.\n
- Sanitization: No sanitization, filtering, or verification of the integrity of the external data is performed before it is processed by the LLM.
Audit Metadata