Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external PDF documents, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The scripts
scripts/extract_form_structure.py,scripts/extract_form_field_info.py, andscripts/convert_pdf_to_images.pyread user-provided PDF files for analysis. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or explicit instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the PDF content during extraction.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (
qpdf,pdftotext,magick) and write files, which could be abused if the agent follows instructions found inside a processed PDF. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the extracted PDF text or structure is performed before presenting it to the agent for decision-making.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions and scripts rely on several external command-line utilities for core functionality.
- Evidence: Documentation in
SKILL.mdandFORMS.mdguides the agent to usepdftotext,qpdf,pdftk, andmagick(ImageMagick) for text extraction, merging, and image manipulation. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic execution techniques to modify library behavior at runtime.
- Evidence: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyperforms monkeypatching of thepypdflibrary'sDictionaryObject.get_inheritedmethod to handle specific PDF choice field attributes. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes several standard Python and Node.js packages for PDF processing.
- Evidence: Packages such as
pypdf,pdfplumber,reportlab,pdf-lib, andpdfjs-distare required by the provided scripts or suggested in the documentation.
Audit Metadata