Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external PDF files, which are untrusted sources.
- Ingestion points: Multiple methods in
SKILL.md(extracting text/tables viapypdfandpdfplumber) andscripts/extract_form_structure.py(extracting text labels for field identification) read content directly from user-provided PDF files. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not include specific boundary markers or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious commands embedded within the extracted PDF text.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes scripts that can write to the local filesystem (
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py,scripts/fill_pdf_form_with_annotations.py) and documentation suggesting the execution of CLI tools likeqpdfandpdftk. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation performed on the text extracted from the PDFs before it is presented to the agent context.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: One of the provided scripts modifies library behavior at runtime.
- Evidence:
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pycontains a functionmonkeypatch_pydpf_methodthat replaces theget_inheritedmethod ofpypdf.generic.DictionaryObjectwith a custom implementation to handle specific PDF field attributes. While used for functional compatibility, this is a form of runtime code modification.
Audit Metadata