xlsx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The module
scripts/office/soffice.pygenerates and compiles C source code at runtime usinggcc. The resulting shared object is then loaded into the execution flow of thesofficebinary using theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. This mechanism is employed to shim AF_UNIX socket calls in restricted environments, but involves high-risk runtime code generation and process injection techniques.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts execute shell commands viasubprocess.run(): \n scripts/office/soffice.pyinvokesgccto compile binary components.\nscripts/recalc.pyandscripts/office/soffice.pyexecutesoffice(LibreOffice) to perform spreadsheet operations.\nscripts/office/validators/redlining.pyexecutesgit difffor text content comparison.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted spreadsheet data from.xlsx,.csv, and.tsvfiles, creating a vulnerability surface.\n- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via
pandas.read_excel(documented inSKILL.md) andopenpyxl.load_workbook(inscripts/recalc.py).\n - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or warnings for the agent to ignore instructions embedded in cell data.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including shell execution and filesystem writes, which could be abused if the agent obeys malicious data content.\n
- Sanitization: While
defusedxmlis correctly used for safe XML parsing, there is no logic to sanitize or filter potential prompt injection instructions within cell values before processing.
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