skills/eigent-ai/agent-skills/xlsx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

xlsx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The module scripts/office/soffice.py generates and compiles C source code at runtime using gcc. The resulting shared object is then loaded into the execution flow of the soffice binary using the LD_PRELOAD environment variable. This mechanism is employed to shim AF_UNIX socket calls in restricted environments, but involves high-risk runtime code generation and process injection techniques.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts execute shell commands via subprocess.run(): \n
  • scripts/office/soffice.py invokes gcc to compile binary components.\n
  • scripts/recalc.py and scripts/office/soffice.py execute soffice (LibreOffice) to perform spreadsheet operations.\n
  • scripts/office/validators/redlining.py executes git diff for text content comparison.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted spreadsheet data from .xlsx, .csv, and .tsv files, creating a vulnerability surface.\n
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via pandas.read_excel (documented in SKILL.md) and openpyxl.load_workbook (in scripts/recalc.py).\n
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or warnings for the agent to ignore instructions embedded in cell data.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including shell execution and filesystem writes, which could be abused if the agent obeys malicious data content.\n
  • Sanitization: While defusedxml is correctly used for safe XML parsing, there is no logic to sanitize or filter potential prompt injection instructions within cell values before processing.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 17, 2026, 04:23 PM