Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's instructions in
forms.mdandSKILL.mdguide the agent to use local command-line utilities, includingqpdf,pdftk, and ImageMagick (magick), to perform PDF and image manipulation tasks. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external PDF files, creating an attack surface where malicious content within a PDF could potentially influence agent behavior. If a PDF contains text designed to look like instructions, an agent extracting that text might be susceptible to indirect injection.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/extract_form_structure.py,scripts/extract_form_field_info.py, and Python code snippets inSKILL.mdthat extract text and metadata from PDF files. - Boundary markers: The output of the extraction scripts is provided as plain text or JSON without specific delimiters or warnings to the agent to disregard instructions within the extracted content.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes the ability to write files (PDFs, images, JSON) and execute local system commands for processing.
- Sanitization: The skill does not perform sanitization or filtering on the text content extracted from user-supplied PDFs.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyimplements a runtime monkeypatch to thepypdf.generic.DictionaryObject.get_inheritedmethod to adjust the library's behavior when handling specific PDF field dictionary attributes. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation lists several external dependencies, including Python libraries (
pypdf,pdfplumber,reportlab,pytesseract,pdf2image,pypdfium2) and Node.js libraries (pdf-lib,pdfjs-dist), as well as system tools (poppler-utils,qpdf).
Audit Metadata