metacognitive-injectors
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides explicit instructions to execute shell commands as part of a multi-model fallback cascade.
- Evidence: Mentions execution of a Node.js script at
<USER_HOME>\\.codex\\.tmp\\marketplaces\\openai-codex\\plugins\\codex\\scripts\\codex-companion.mjs(SKILL.md, Section 3). - Evidence: Instructs the use of
codex exec --skip-git-repo-checkandclaude -p ...for auditing and task sign-off. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses local databases and configuration files that store facts, session history, and project-specific conventions.
- Evidence: Reads from
usmc_memory.db(SQLite),gardener.py,CLAUDE.md,.SYNC, andAGENTS.mdto retrieve context and lessons. - Evidence: Mentions persisting state in
AUTOMATIONS-MEMORY.mdor local buffers. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest data from observed learning effects and session histories and incorporate them into the agent's reasoning process.
- Ingestion points: Data is pulled from the Gardener DB and USMC SQLite DB (SKILL.md, Section 1A).
- Boundary markers: Documentation does not specify the use of delimiters or sanitization when processing this external memory data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands and read local files.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the retrieved memory content is mentioned.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill intentionally uses "injectors" to modify or override the agent's standard reasoning process using tailored patterns.
- Evidence: Section 4 "Bereichsspezifische Prompt-Injektion (Tailored Injection Pattern)" describes using a Python script (
agy_metacognitive_prompt_injector.py) to inject reasoning strategies.
Audit Metadata