strategic-revision
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external referee correspondence and internal feedback (PDF or text formats), as described in Phase 1 and 2 of the protocol. This untrusted data could contain instructions meant to influence the agent's behavior during the analysis or planning phases.
- Ingestion points: Phased reading of external PDFs (e.g.,
{venue}-round{n}-reviews.pdf) and text-based feedback reports inreferences/phases.md. - Boundary markers: The skill employs a 'Verbatim Gate' in Phase 4 requiring exact transcription and provides LaTeX escaping rules (e.g.,
&to\&) to prevent command injection into document artifacts. - Capability inventory: The agent can write various Markdown and JSON files, execute a Python script (
dag_validator.py) viauv, and compile documents usinglatexmk. - Sanitization: Standard LaTeX escaping is performed during Phase 4, but there is no specific sanitization for natural language instructions embedded within the feedback.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to perform several shell operations to manage the revision workspace. These include creating directories (
mkdir), copying files (cp), and compiling LaTeX documentation (latexmk). Additionally, it executes a provided Python script (dag_validator.py) to validate the revision tasks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes the
uvtool to execute thedag_validator.pyscript with thenetworkxlibrary specified as an ephemeral dependency (uv run --with networkx). This results in the download of thenetworkxpackage from the Python Package Index (PyPI).networkxis a well-known and standard library for graph analysis.
Audit Metadata