field-service-scheduling-policy-designer-query
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a potential surface for indirect prompt injection as it collects user-provided strings for policy names and descriptions which are passed to subsequent skills.
- Ingestion points: User input provided during the interview sequence for the 'name' and 'description' fields in SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not explicitly instruct the agent to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions within the user-provided strings when passing the JSON block.
- Capability inventory: The skill itself has no dangerous capabilities. However, it is the first step in a chain that leads to
sfs-sobject-create, which performs write operations to a Salesforce instance. - Sanitization: Absent. There are no instructions for validating or escaping the user-provided text before it is bundled into the JSON object.
Audit Metadata