platform-capability-search
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to execute a series of subcommands via${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/sf-context. These commands are scoped to discovery, journey tracking, and organizational feature detection within the Salesforce ecosystem. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill manages the installation of new capabilities using
npx skills@1.5.20to pull from theforcedotcom/sf-skillsrepository. This process is protected by multiple security layers, including version pinning and the requirement for a specific, non-reconstructible command format. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a guarded mechanism to add new tools. This capability is secured by a validation step that checks the skill name against a strict regular expression (
^[a-z0-9]+(-[a-z0-9]+)*$) and ensures the metadata matches a predefined 'publicAvailable' status before execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes capability catalogs which may contain untrusted data. It implements a mandatory evidence chain for safety:
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via the
sf-context discoverycommands. - Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly designate all catalog descriptions and summaries as 'untrusted metadata' and forbid the agent from following instructions found within them.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution via the
Bashtool and thenpxinstaller. - Sanitization: All skill names are validated via regex, and a confirmation nonce mechanism is used for high-impact actions like resetting the project journey history.
Audit Metadata