platform-custom-field-generate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONNO_CODE
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from the user and incorporating it into metadata files saved to the local environment.
- Ingestion points: User-provided field labels, descriptions, and picklist values defined in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions provided to wrap untrusted content in specific delimiters or to add warnings to ignore embedded instructions within the user-supplied data.
- Capability inventory: File-write capabilities (e.g.,
force-app/main/default/objects/) to the local project structure as described in theSKILL.mdinstructions. - Sanitization: While the skill correctly mandates CDATA blocks for formula fields and provides naming conventions, it lacks explicit instructions to sanitize or escape special characters for other text nodes like
<description>and<inlineHelpText>.
Audit Metadata