platform-flexipage-generate

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts/scan-lwc-components.sh script is vulnerable to shell command injection. The script processes user-supplied query strings using an echo command inside a subshell expansion: $(echo "$QUERY" | tr ... ). If the query string contains shell metacharacters like $() or backticks, the bash shell will evaluate and execute them as commands during the variable expansion phase.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts/resolve-component-instructions.sh script contains a similar command injection vulnerability. It evaluates the component definition argument using echo inside a subshell: $(echo "$COMPONENT" | sed ... ). Maliciously crafted component names can trigger arbitrary command execution on the host system.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs the official Salesforce CLI templates plugin to support FlexiPage generation tasks. This is a reference to a well-known service functionality.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary workflow involves transforming natural language user intent into executable Salesforce metadata and Lightning Web Component (LWC) source code, which represents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: User utterances describing requested components and page configurations are parsed to identify intents in Step 1 of the Adding Components workflow.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions for the agent to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions when interpolating user intent into tool arguments or generated files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the Bash tool to execute sf project deploy (metadata deployment), sf template generate (file generation), and performs local file system write operations for LWC generation.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not provide mechanisms for validating or escaping user-provided names, labels, or descriptions before they are used in CLI commands or generated source code, potentially allowing a user to inject malicious metadata or code properties.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 23, 2026, 05:01 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — platform-flexipage-generate