service-agentforce-channel-configure
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically creates and modifies Salesforce metadata files (XML and YAML) at runtime. It retrieves templates from the
assets/directory and interpolates user-supplied values, such as agent labels, queue IDs, and routing labels, before deploying them to the target organization using thesf project deploycommand. This behavior is found inSKILL.md,references/channel-branch-email.md, andreferences/routing-flow.md. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides a surface for indirect injection by ingesting untrusted data through user prompts and inserting it into configuration files.
- Ingestion points: User-provided strings for
LEGAL_DISCLAIMER_TEXT,SIGNATURE_TEXT, andLABELare collected inreferences/channel-branch-email.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions within these text fields.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to deploy these modified files to a Salesforce org via
sf project deploy startandsf api request rest(documented inreferences/channel-branch-email.md). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping for XML/YAML special characters in the provided Python validation scripts or the main workflow instructions.
Audit Metadata