service-itsm-agentic-setup-employee-agent-configure

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes data from external Salesforce API endpoints, creating a potential surface for instructions embedded in source metadata to influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Data is fetched via sf api request rest from the agent-templates endpoint and via sf data query from BotDefinition records (Phases 1 and 2).
  • Boundary markers: The workflow uses explicit AskUserQuestion confirmation gates before performing any write operations and leverages standalone Node.js scripts to isolate parsing logic from the main prompt context.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is permitted to execute shell commands (sf, node), read/write local files, and prompt the user for input.
  • Sanitization: The build-create-body.mjs script implements yamlDoubleQuoteEscape to prevent user-supplied strings from breaking the YAML structure of the Agent Script and uses a multi-pass HTML entity decoder to normalize template content.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the Salesforce CLI (sf) for all interactions with the target environment.
  • The instructions explicitly direct the use of sf api request rest and sf data query, which utilize the CLI's internal session management. This is a secure alternative to manual token handling, as it avoids exposing bearer tokens in shell command histories or environment logs.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 27, 2026, 04:35 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — service-itsm-agentic-setup-employee-agent-configure