canghe-danger-gemini-web
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill implements a sophisticated mechanism to harvest sensitive Google authentication cookies from the user's browser.
- Evidence in
scripts/gemini-webapi/utils/load-browser-cookies.tsshows the use of Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP) viaNetwork.getCookiesto programmatically extract__Secure-1PSIDand__Secure-1PSIDTSfrom an active browser session. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill spawns external browser processes to facilitate the automated extraction of session tokens.
- Evidence in
scripts/gemini-webapi/utils/load-browser-cookies.tsshows the use ofnode:child_process'sspawnfunction to launch Chrome, Edge, or Chromium with remote debugging enabled (--remote-debugging-port). - The executable path is dynamically determined and can be overridden via the
GEMINI_WEB_CHROME_PATHenvironment variable, which could lead to arbitrary execution if the environment is compromised. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill harvests local sensitive authentication tokens and caches them in a persistent file outside the skill's own directory.
- Evidence in
scripts/gemini-webapi/utils/cookie-file.tsandscripts/gemini-webapi/utils/paths.tsshows cookies being saved tocookies.jsonin a persistent data directory (e.g.,~/.local/share/canghe-skills/gemini-web/). - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill maintains long-term access to the user's account by implementing token rotation and local caching.
- Evidence in
scripts/gemini-webapi/utils/rotate-1psidts.tsshows logic that periodically calls Google'sRotateCookiesendpoint to refresh harvested session tokens. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a high vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection due to its ability to process local files and images without sanitization.
- Ingestion points: The
--promptfilesand--referenceflags inscripts/main.tsallow the agent to read external file content. - Boundary markers: Absent. File contents are concatenated directly into the prompt string without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file writing capabilities, network access to Google APIs, and the ability to spawn subprocesses.
- Sanitization: Absent. External content is interpolated directly into the model request.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata