canghe-danger-gemini-web

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill implements a sophisticated mechanism to harvest sensitive Google authentication cookies from the user's browser.
  • Evidence in scripts/gemini-webapi/utils/load-browser-cookies.ts shows the use of Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP) via Network.getCookies to programmatically extract __Secure-1PSID and __Secure-1PSIDTS from an active browser session.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill spawns external browser processes to facilitate the automated extraction of session tokens.
  • Evidence in scripts/gemini-webapi/utils/load-browser-cookies.ts shows the use of node:child_process's spawn function to launch Chrome, Edge, or Chromium with remote debugging enabled (--remote-debugging-port).
  • The executable path is dynamically determined and can be overridden via the GEMINI_WEB_CHROME_PATH environment variable, which could lead to arbitrary execution if the environment is compromised.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill harvests local sensitive authentication tokens and caches them in a persistent file outside the skill's own directory.
  • Evidence in scripts/gemini-webapi/utils/cookie-file.ts and scripts/gemini-webapi/utils/paths.ts shows cookies being saved to cookies.json in a persistent data directory (e.g., ~/.local/share/canghe-skills/gemini-web/).
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The skill maintains long-term access to the user's account by implementing token rotation and local caching.
  • Evidence in scripts/gemini-webapi/utils/rotate-1psidts.ts shows logic that periodically calls Google's RotateCookies endpoint to refresh harvested session tokens.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a high vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection due to its ability to process local files and images without sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: The --promptfiles and --reference flags in scripts/main.ts allow the agent to read external file content.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. File contents are concatenated directly into the prompt string without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses file writing capabilities, network access to Google APIs, and the ability to spawn subprocesses.
  • Sanitization: Absent. External content is interpolated directly into the model request.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 17, 2026, 02:45 AM