zig-raylib
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to configure
build.zig.zonto fetch theraylib-zigdependency directly from a remote Git repository (https://github.com/raylib-zig/raylib-zig#main). This process involves downloading and building external code during the compilation phase, which is a standard part of the Zig ecosystem but introduces a dependency on a third-party source. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents numerous functions that ingest untrusted external data, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Functions such as
rl.loadTexture,rl.loadSound,rl.loadModel,rl.loadDroppedFiles, and UI widgets likerg.textBoxorrl.getClipboardTextingest data from the filesystem, network-adjacent sources, or direct user input. - Boundary markers: The provided instructions do not include explicit boundary markers or warnings to the agent to treat data from these sources as untrusted.
- Capability inventory: The skill enables several potentially dangerous actions including filesystem writes (
rl.takeScreenshot,rl.exportMesh,rl.exportWave), and network navigation viarl.openURL. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation logic is provided for the content ingested through these interfaces before it is processed or used to influence agent behavior.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation relies on the Zig build system (
zig build), which executes build scripts (build.zig) that can perform arbitrary operations on the host system as part of the project compilation and dependency resolution process.
Audit Metadata