agentic-engagement
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external email content, which serves as an untrusted data source for the agent.
- Ingestion points: The agent is configured with a native email trigger in
infra/agents/engager.tsthat wakes the agent onrepliedevents, and it utilizes thelistEmailEventscapability to read thread history. - Boundary markers: The system instructions in
infra/agents/engager.prompt.tsdo not define explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potential malicious prompts embedded within lead emails. - Capability inventory: The agent has access to
sendEmailandlistEmailEventsnative actions, as well as memory and context tools. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the email body content before it is processed by the language model.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The evaluation script
evals/contract.mjsutilizes dynamic imports to load and inspect the resource graph. - Evidence:
await import("../infra/agents/engager.ts?contract=${Date.now()}");inevals/contract.mjs. - Context: This is a local import used for development-time resource validation and does not involve loading code from external or untrusted sources.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of specific CLI tools and SDKs provided by the platform vendor.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdreferences the installation of@cargo-ai/cliand dependency on@cargo-ai/cdk. - Context: These are official resources from the skill author (Cargo AI) and are necessary for the deployment and management of the infrastructure defined in the skill.
Audit Metadata