agentic-engagement

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external email content, which serves as an untrusted data source for the agent.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is configured with a native email trigger in infra/agents/engager.ts that wakes the agent on replied events, and it utilizes the listEmailEvents capability to read thread history.
  • Boundary markers: The system instructions in infra/agents/engager.prompt.ts do not define explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potential malicious prompts embedded within lead emails.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to sendEmail and listEmailEvents native actions, as well as memory and context tools.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the email body content before it is processed by the language model.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The evaluation script evals/contract.mjs utilizes dynamic imports to load and inspect the resource graph.
  • Evidence: await import("../infra/agents/engager.ts?contract=${Date.now()}"); in evals/contract.mjs.
  • Context: This is a local import used for development-time resource validation and does not involve loading code from external or untrusted sources.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of specific CLI tools and SDKs provided by the platform vendor.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md references the installation of @cargo-ai/cli and dependency on @cargo-ai/cdk.
  • Context: These are official resources from the skill author (Cargo AI) and are necessary for the deployment and management of the infrastructure defined in the skill.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 5, 2026, 08:46 PM