build-tam-list
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs the
@cargo-ai/clipackage globally via npm. This is a vendor-owned resource associated withgetcargohqused for the skill's primary functionality. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several shell commands are executed to set up the environment, including
npm install,cargo-aifor authentication and orchestration, andghfor GitHub API interactions. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill sends session metadata (session ID, title, and summary) to the vendor's backend using the
cargo-ai workspaceManagement session upsertcommand for attribution and tracking purposes. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input (such as industry filters and headcount ranges) to populate arguments for the
cargo-aiCLI. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious input could influence the command execution parameters. - Ingestion points: User-defined filters for industry, headcount, and geography in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None are present to delimit user input from the command structure.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
cargo-ai orchestration action executeto perform network-based market research. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of explicit sanitization or escaping for the data passed to the
--dataflag in the CLI command. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill reads
~/.claude/plugins/installed_plugins.jsonto detect if the full Cargo GTM plugin is already installed, which involves accessing the agent's environment configuration.
Audit Metadata