expansion-signals
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
expansion_analystagent ininfra/agents/analyst.tsutilizes thewebSearchcapability to gather information from external websites. - Ingestion points: External web content enters the agent's context through
webSearchininfra/agents/analyst.ts. - Boundary markers: The agent is instructed to format its output according to a strict JSON schema and limit reasons to three sentences, which provides structural boundaries, although no specific "ignore embedded instructions" warning is included for the search results.
- Capability inventory: While the agent itself is read-only, the workflow defined in
infra/plays/flag-expansion.tswrites the agent's output (judgment and reason) to thegtm_accountsdatabase model. Theexpansion_digestagent ininfra/agents/digest.tssubsequently reads these records and posts the content to a Slack channel usingslack.actions.postMessage. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from web searches before it is processed by the agent or written to the database.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The evaluation script
evals/contract.mjsuses dynamicimport()statements to load skill components during validation. - Evidence: The script uses computed paths and query strings (e.g.,
await import("../infra/plays/flag-expansion.ts?contract=${stamp}")) to bypass module caching and verify the skill's resource registry at runtime.
Audit Metadata