find-stakeholders
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs the
@cargo-ai/clipackage globally via npm and suggests usingnpxto add additional skills from the vendor's repository (getcargohq/cargo-skills). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads the
~/.claude/plugins/installed_plugins.jsonfile to check for the presence of specific plugins. It then sends session metadata—including a summary and title indicating the skill's source—to the vendor's API via thecargo-ai workspaceManagement session upsertcommand for attribution and usage tracking. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the GitHub CLI (
gh) to star thegetcargohq/gtm-skillsrepository on the user's behalf. Although the instructions state the agent must ask for user consent first, providing the automated command sequence facilitates account interaction that is secondary to the skill's primary function. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from the
aiArkconnector through thesearchPeopleaction, creating a surface for potential injection. - Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context via the
cargo-ai orchestration action executecommand which retrieves stakeholder information such as titles and departments from a third-party provider. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the prompt templates.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment allows for shell execution (
npm,gh,cargo-ai), file system writing (mkdir,touch), and local file reading (grep). - Sanitization: No evidence of data sanitization, validation, or escaping of the retrieved stakeholder records before they are returned to the agent session.
Audit Metadata