inbound-qualification

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input from a public web form (e.g., first name, last name, and message fields) which is later ingested by an AI lead researcher agent for analysis.
  • Ingestion points: Public form fields defined in infra/tools/inbound-form.ts and site/components/inbound-form.tsx.
  • Boundary markers: The agent in infra/agents/lead-researcher.ts uses a structured system prompt and a specific JSON output schema to constrain model behavior and prevent hallucination or instruction override.
  • Capability inventory: The researcher agent utilizes webSearch and context (read-only). The associated workflows perform postMessage (Slack) and modelCustomColumn (writes to GTM models).
  • Sanitization: Input fields are validated using a Zod schema in the inbound_form workflow definition to ensure data integrity before processing.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes vendor-specific libraries for deployment, infrastructure definition, and frontend form management.
  • Evidence: References to @cargo-ai/cli, @cargo-ai/cdk, and @cargo-ai/form-sdk in SKILL.md, evals/contract.mjs, and references/form.md.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions and evaluation scripts utilize the vendor's CLI tool for administrative and deployment tasks.
  • Evidence: Usage of cargo-ai cdk plan, cargo-ai cdk deploy, and cargo-ai storage column list as documented in the skill's operational procedures.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 5, 2026, 08:46 PM