inbound-qualification
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input from a public web form (e.g., first name, last name, and message fields) which is later ingested by an AI lead researcher agent for analysis.
- Ingestion points: Public form fields defined in
infra/tools/inbound-form.tsandsite/components/inbound-form.tsx. - Boundary markers: The agent in
infra/agents/lead-researcher.tsuses a structured system prompt and a specific JSON output schema to constrain model behavior and prevent hallucination or instruction override. - Capability inventory: The researcher agent utilizes
webSearchandcontext(read-only). The associated workflows performpostMessage(Slack) andmodelCustomColumn(writes to GTM models). - Sanitization: Input fields are validated using a Zod schema in the
inbound_formworkflow definition to ensure data integrity before processing. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes vendor-specific libraries for deployment, infrastructure definition, and frontend form management.
- Evidence: References to
@cargo-ai/cli,@cargo-ai/cdk, and@cargo-ai/form-sdkinSKILL.md,evals/contract.mjs, andreferences/form.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions and evaluation scripts utilize the vendor's CLI tool for administrative and deployment tasks.
- Evidence: Usage of
cargo-ai cdk plan,cargo-ai cdk deploy, andcargo-ai storage column listas documented in the skill's operational procedures.
Audit Metadata