linkedin-content
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The system prompt in
infra/agents/content-writer.prompt.tscontains an explicit instruction override that directs the agent to prioritize external files over its core instructions. - Evidence: The prompt states: "Repository conventions win over anything in this prompt. Read AGENTS.md (or CLAUDE.md) first... Repository conventions win over anything in this prompt."
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The agent is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from the repository to generate content.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads data from files located in
context/(including positioning, proof points, insights, and objections) andcadence/log/(weekly team logs) as seen ininfra/agents/content-writer.prompt.ts. - Boundary markers: The agent lacks delimiters or specific instructions to isolate external data from its internal reasoning, increasing the risk of the model following instructions embedded within those files.
- Capability inventory: The agent uses the
claudeCodeharness, which allows it to read and write files and execute GitHub commands likegh pr listandgh pr create. - Sanitization: The skill does not implement any escaping or filtering of the content read from the repository before processing it.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The agent is designed to execute shell commands to manage its workflow in the repository.
- Evidence: In
infra/agents/content-writer.prompt.ts, the agent is instructed to rungh pr list --state open --search "in:title [linkedin-content] <week>" --json number,urlto detect existing work. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of vendor-owned packages to function.
- Evidence: The skill documentation in
SKILL.mdspecifies requirements for@cargo-ai/cliand@cargo-ai/cdk.
Audit Metadata