stalled-deal-nudge
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The agent processes untrusted data from activity logs (emails, notes, and meeting summaries) to generate follow-up drafts and Slack digests.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads the
subjectandbodyfields from thegtm_activitiesmodel as defined ininfra/models/gtm-activities.tsandinfra/agents/nudger.prompt.ts. - Boundary markers: The prompt interpolation does not include explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the activity data.
- Capability inventory: The agent's capabilities are restricted. It has read-only access to most models and is only permitted to write to the
deal_nudgesledger and post to Slack using a lockedchannelIddefined ininfra/agents/nudger.ts. It cannot send emails or modify CRM data. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering of the activity log content is implemented before it is processed by the language model.
Audit Metadata