standup
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a
claudeCodeharness to execute local scripts and CLI tools. Specifically, it runsscripts/collect/day.tsto gather git history andgh(GitHub CLI) data. It also uses thecargo-aiCLI to read workspace metrics such as run counts and usage. These operations are limited to read-only actions through strict system prompt instructions and environment isolation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The agent processes untrusted external content, including git commit messages and pull request titles. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection. However, the skill mitigates this by using a deterministic collection script (reducing LLM improvisation) and providing specific structural and 'voice' constraints in the system prompt to ensure the agent maintains its reporting role.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/collect/day.ts(git/gh data),cargo-aiCLI calls. - Boundary markers: Present in
standup.prompt.tsvia structured sections and 'Voice' rules. - Capability inventory:
claudeCodeharness has tool access (slack.postMessage) and shell access; the agent spec itself includes no additionalcapabilities. - Sanitization: Mitigated by strict output formatting rules and the use of markdown templates.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and installs the
@cargo-ai/clipackage vianpx. As this package belongs to the skill's authoring organization and is a standard component of the platform's infrastructure, it is considered a safe dependency. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to post digests to Slack. To prevent unauthorized data exposure, the
channelIdis hard-locked in the connector configuration, ensuring the agent cannot redirect internal project data to external or customer-facing channels.
Audit Metadata