cursor-cli-delegation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a multi-step delegation pattern by generating a "Mission Packet" that is passed to a downstream agent (Cursor Agent CLI) for execution. This creates a risk where instructions or data processed in the primary session could maliciously influence the sub-agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: User instructions and session context are ingested to generate the Mission Packet described in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill requires the packet to include "stop conditions," "preserved behavior," "explicit non-goals," and "observable acceptance" criteria to limit the sub-agent's scope.
- Capability inventory: The sub-agent invoked via the CLI has capabilities for file system modification, arbitrary command execution, network access, and MCP tool usage (
references/cursor-agent-cli.md). - Sanitization: The instructions explicitly forbid placing secrets or hardcoded credentials in the mission packet, recommending references to environment variables instead.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill documentation describes the use of high-privilege flags such as
--forceand--trust. As noted in thereferences/cursor-agent-cli.mdfile, the--forceflag enables an unattended execution mode that bypasses MCP tool confirmations, trusts the workspace, and enables web tools, effectively removing standard interaction-based safety gates. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The core functionality of the skill relies on invoking the local
agentCLI binary using several sub-commands (agent models,agent status,agent --print) to execute the delegated mission. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references official documentation, changelogs, and tool references hosted on
cursor.com. These references target a well-known service associated with the skill's primary functionality.
Audit Metadata