agent-platform-eval-flywheel
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection Surface: The skill evaluates data from various sources (CSV, JSONL, GCS, and ADK traces) using LLM-based metrics. This represents a potential surface where instructions embedded in the data could influence the judge model's evaluation process.
- Ingestion Points: Data enters the context via
EvaluationDatasetconstructors and GCS file reading inscripts/endpoint_evaluation.pyandscripts/parse_adk_traces.py. - Boundary Markers: The skill relies on the underlying
agentplatformSDK to handle prompt boundaries. - Capability Inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
subprocess, make network requests to GCP APIs, and write result artifacts to the local file system. - Sanitization: Explicit sanitization of processed data before evaluation is not detailed in the skill's high-level logic.
- Command Execution via Subprocess: The skill uses
subprocess.runto interact with Google Cloud CLI tools. While these are legitimate vendor resources, they involve executing commands in the host environment. - Authentication:
scripts/endpoint_evaluation.pyexecutesgcloud auth print-access-tokento retrieve a temporary credential for API authentication. This is a standard pattern for GCP-integrated tools. - Data Retrieval: The same script uses
gsutil catto download datasets from GCS buckets specified by the user.
Audit Metadata