competitor-ad-intelligence
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from multiple external sources which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data is collected from Meta, TikTok, Google, and LinkedIn ad libraries via the
scrapecreators-api, and landing page content is fetched viafetch_webpageorcurlin Phase 6. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions to wrap the external content before it is processed by the LLM.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
curlfor network requests and potential command execution. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, filtering, or escaping of the fetched external content is defined before interpolation into the analysis phases.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to use
curlas a fallback method to fetch landing page content in Phase 6. - Evidence: 'Or use
curliffetch_webpageis unavailable.' in SKILL.md. While intended for fetching web content, this provides a pathway for executing shell commands with external URLs as arguments. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches data and configuration from several external ad platform APIs and transparency centers.
- Evidence: Phase 1 through 4 detail operations against Meta, TikTok, Google, and LinkedIn infrastructure. These are documented neutrally as they are core to the skill's stated purpose of ad intelligence.
Audit Metadata