competitor-ad-intelligence

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from multiple external sources which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Data is collected from Meta, TikTok, Google, and LinkedIn ad libraries via the scrapecreators-api, and landing page content is fetched via fetch_webpage or curl in Phase 6.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions to wrap the external content before it is processed by the LLM.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes curl for network requests and potential command execution.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, filtering, or escaping of the fetched external content is defined before interpolation into the analysis phases.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to use curl as a fallback method to fetch landing page content in Phase 6.
  • Evidence: 'Or use curl if fetch_webpage is unavailable.' in SKILL.md. While intended for fetching web content, this provides a pathway for executing shell commands with external URLs as arguments.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches data and configuration from several external ad platform APIs and transparency centers.
  • Evidence: Phase 1 through 4 detail operations against Meta, TikTok, Google, and LinkedIn infrastructure. These are documented neutrally as they are core to the skill's stated purpose of ad intelligence.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 01:36 PM